Susan Pockett presents sound arguments supporting her reinterpretations of data that Libet and co-workers used to support a number of intriguing and influential conclusions regarding the microgenesis and timing of (a) conscious sensory experience and (b) volitionally controlled motor responses. The following analysis, extending and elaborating some of her main arguments, proposes that Libet's experimental methodologies and rationales, and thus also his interpretation of data, are flawed and that neglect or ignorance of methodological and empirical constraints well known to sensory psychologists risks drawing premature or faulty conclusions about the timing of conscious experience. © 2002 Elsevier Science (USA) Davies (1984) claims that we will understand the mystery of mind only when we understand the mystery of time. Implied is an intimate relation between time and consciousness as part of the deep structure of the cosmos. Perhaps for that reason the recent interest in the topic of consciousness expressed by experts in the ''hard'' sciences of physics and cosmology (Davies, 1984; Penrose, 1994) as well as neurobiology (Crick, 1995; Edelman, 1992 ) is apropos and welcome. The concern of the present article is not with any deep-structure relation between consciousness and time; rather, it is more concerned with experimental methodologies in which time and consciousness serve as variables. The relation between the two has been investigated by psychologists and philosophers for over a century (Wundt, 1904; Dennett, 1991; Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992) . Psychophysicists in particular have developed a number of relevant methodologies for studying the microgenesis of sensory experience and concomitantly have discovered a number of useful empirical regularities. These methodologies and regularities serve as constraints to any interpretations of data, and these constraints are neglected only at the peril of drawing faulty conclusions. I argue, along with Pockett, that such neglect has contributed to Libet and colleagues' flawed interpretations.
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In a prior article (Breitmeyer, 1985) I addressed some of the methodological concerns regarding work presented by Libet (1985) on the role of conscious will in voluntary action. In my opinion, at least four major issues must be addressed when interpreting results of studies that use a sense-evoked experience to assess the timing of other experiences, be these evoked by another sensory event, electrical stimulation of the nervous system, or a decision to act voluntarily.
Prior-Entry Effects
Noted but not sufficiently addressed by Libet (e.g., Libet, 1985) is the problem of the prior-entry effect. This effect, known for over a century (Wundt, 1904) , rests on well-known empirical findings showing that attended events gain entry into conscious experience prior to nonattended events. The experiments conducted by Libet and coworkers are mostly variants of what are known as multitask paradigms, i.e., experiments in which subjects must monitor two or more ''channels'' in order, in this case, to decide if events in them are experienced simultaneously. Not knowing whether subjects are adopting a strategy of serially switching selective attention among channels over time or of simultaneously allocating limited attentional capacity to channels and, if so, at what relative proportions, one cannot determine the role of prior-entry effects. Without such knowledge, interpretations of results as to timing of events in consciousness are at least partially compromised.
Intramodal Timing Differences Associated with Stimulus Intensity Differences
More intense sensory stimuli are experienced more readily and speedily. Sensory latency differences produced by varying stimulus intensity can result from at least two neural response properties. (1) As is well known, the response latency to stimulus onset generally decreases as stimulus intensity increases. (2) More interesting and relevant are response temporal summation. For example, in vision, Bloch's law states that the time-integrated energy (duration ϫ luminance) of a stimulus determines the threshold for its detection. For stimuli varying in spatial frequency (Legge, 1978) or wavelength (Mituboshi et al., 1987 ) the trade-off between stimulus luminance (or contrast) and duration can extend over an interval of 150-300 ms. It is thus not surprising that a weak, near-threshold stimulus must be presented longer in order to generate a conscious sensation than does a strong stimulus. By reasonable extrapolation, this ought to hold also for nonsensory stimuli such as trains of electrical pulses stimulating the cortex directly. As noted by Pockett, Libet and co-workers found that stronger pulses could be presented for shorter train durations than weaker ones in order to produce a conscious sensation. This is entirely expected from a trade-off between stimulus intensity and duration. Thus, Pockett's reinterpretation of Libet's data on the time necessary for stimuli to enter awareness is correct when she concludes that ''all that can be said from these [Libet's] experiments is that direct cerebral stimulation with a low stimulus intensity elicits a sensation after a certain number of pulses, while direct cerebral stimulation with higher stimulus intensities elicits a sensation after fewer and fewer pulses as the stimulus intensity increases [i.e., after shorter durations of pulse trains].'' Consequently, the results of direct cortical stimulation cannot sustain Libet's general claim that a normally induced conscious sensation requires cerebral durations of several hundreds of milliseconds. By analogy, a temporal integration time of, say, 250 ms for near-threshold visual stimuli does not warrant a psychophysicist's claim that experience of visual stimuli in general requires them to have at least a 250-ms duration.
The Noncommensuration of Intramodal Sensory and Electrical Stimulation
Regarding Libet et al.'s (1979) interpretation of data supporting subjective referral backward in time and Pockett's analysis of these interpretations, I add the following.
In this study, electrical stimulation of either the cortex or of the medial lemniscus/ thalamus is compared to skin stimulation. In view of the concerns noted in Point 2 above, the problem here is to define as precisely as possible when the two sources of stimulation yield sensory responses of similar magnitude so that commensurate comparisons can be made between the timing of the electrically and the skin elicited sensations. It was asserted, rather than clearly demonstrated, that the procedures used by Libet et al. (1979) produced sensations that resembled each other as much as possible. But did they-and by what standard? Since sensory response latency depends on stimulus intensity, differences in the effective stimulus intensity could introduce substantial timing errors. Using standard psychophysical techniques could minimize such noncommensuration. For instance, one could first have measured threshold intensities for skin and electrical stimulation and then have used suprathreshold intensities that were equal multiples of the threshold intensities. No such careful equating of suprathreshold electrical and skin stimulation was performed. Perhaps the nature of the subject sample made such equating impractical, even if in principle doable. At any rate, a subjective standard by which an experimenter deems two stimuli to resemble each other as much as possible would not pass muster in a psychophysical experiment in which, for instance, the results to be interpreted were reaction times.
The Noncommensuration of Crossmodal Sensory Stimulation
For similar reasons, the noncommensuration of crossmodal sensory stimulation also poses a problem for Libet's (1985) interpretation of conscious intention of voluntary action. In this study the timing of a subject's awareness of (a) wanting to move, (b) actual movement, and (c) a randomly delivered stimulus pulse to the back of the hand were to be judged relative to a the perceived position of a spot of light revolving at a constant angular rate on an oscilloscope screen. Besides the prior-entry effect, additional problems could arise, as noted by Pockett, due to intrinsic response-latency differences among different sense modalities. However, in addition to this source of constant error in timing sensory events, a noncommensuration of crossmodal sensory magnitudes may also exist. Clearly that possibility exists when comparing the timing of the perceived visual spot position to the pulse delivered to the back of the hand. For instance, if the two stimuli elicited sensations of different comparable crossmodal magnitudes, this could add to any of the intrinsic latency differences and thus to the constant errors in judging the timing of sensory events. Crossmodal psychophysical scaling or equating of sensory magnitudes is possible; however, it was not done in the Libet (1985) study.
A similar argument holds when comparing the revolving spot position to awareness of the actual motor response insofar as awareness of the latter generates proprioceptive sensations.
The problem is compounded when trying to compare the clock position of the revolving spot to the timing of the intention to move. While the moving spot is an ''external'' stimulus, the intention is an ''internal'' one, i.e., one produced by and in the brain/mind rather than outside of it. Even Fechner, the founder of psychophysical methods, was frustrated in his attempts to develop such an ''internal psychophysics.'' He therefore focused on developing an ''external psychophysics,'' since the external stimulus intensities could be easily measured with precisely calibrated instruments and thus in turn could provide a way to scale changes of sensory magnitude associated with changes in the energy of the stimulus. No such scales or techniques were available to measure the magnitude of internally generated stimuli like intentions. To my knowledge there still is no standardized internal psychophysics of intention, concentration, effort, and other states associated with consciousness. Comparison of the magnitude of a sensed intention to that of a sensation produced by an external stimulus thus is not yet practicable. More broadly speaking, this may be the crux of the problem with Libet's technique. It is a bold, but unfortunately unsatisfactory, attempt at developing such an internal psychophysics.
On a closing note, I point out that one of Pockett's points of contention in her analysis of Libet et al.'s (1967) evoked potential studies is questionable. Based on these studies, Libet (1993) concluded that the later rather than early components of evoked potentials appear to be associated with conscious experience. Pockett would like to claim such an association also for the early response components. However, empirical evidence from several studies point out that indeed it appears to be the later, and not the early, components of (a) the human visual-evoked cortical potential (Bridgeman, 1988) and (b) the single-cell responses in V1 of monkey (Super et al., 2001) that are related to the conscious perception of a stimulus.
